Кремлины неподражаемы: это Юкос 2.0
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rnoflyzone в Кремлины неподражаемы: это Юкос 2.0
rnoflyzone в Кремлины неподражаемы: это Юкос 2.0 Кремлины действительно в Минских соглашениях подписались на сохранение ЗСТ с Укрой! А теперь опять получают обвинения в нарушении своих обязательств! Сейчас их оштрафуют на 100 миллиардов. Еврокомиссия вполне в таком праве.
Как раз в Минских соглашениях прописано черным по белому, что должны быть приняты практические шаги по снятию российских озабоченностей. Ни одного практического шага по снятию российских озабоченностей за эти полтора года предпринято не было
замглавы Минэкономразвития РФ Алексей Лихачев
Но Еврокомиссия считает иначе!!! Что все необходимые практические шаги предприняты были!!! Еврокомиссия выпустила документ из 6 пунктов, в котором, по её мнению, развенчала российскую ложь.
T R I L A T E R A L T A L K S O N EU-UK R A I N E DCFTA
DI S T I N G U I S H I N G B E T W E E N MY T H S & RE A L I T Y
The EU remains committed and open to achieving practical solutions to Russia's
concerns on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Area (DCFTA).
The trilateral consultation process at ministerial level was launched in July 2014.
Up to end of 2015, 13 trilateral meetings, including 4 at ministerial level, have
taken place to this end.
This document sheds some light on certain myths related to this process.
Myth 1: Russia can change CIS-FTA customs rules without having to hold consultations with all
other CIS-FTA countries.
Reality: Russia claims it adheres to CIS-FTA rules and the resulting obligation of mutual
consultations. It disregards the same CIS-FTA rules, however, when it comes to unilaterally
withdrawing trade preferences towards Moldova (July 2014) and now Ukraine.
Under CIS-FTA safeguards rules (annex 6), in order to increase import tariffs against another CIS-FTA
member (e.g. Ukraine), Russia must:
consult the other countries of the CIS-FTA;
demonstrate product by product that the changed circumstances (i.e. the provisional
application of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA as of 1 January 2016) would lead to 'an increase in
imports from the Party in such quantities as to cause damage or threaten to harm the
industry of Custom Union'.
Currently, Russia neither demonstrated such an increase in imports or related negative effects
stemming from the implementation of the DCFTA because the DCFTA has not yet come into force.
The Commission has offered to continue the consultations after 1 January 2016. The Commission's
offer to continue is however conditional on Russia's revocation of the Presidential decree that
suspends it CIS FTA obligations towards Ukraine.
Myth 2: The EU demands that all goods sold on the Ukrainian market should comply with
European technical standards. This excludes Russian products from the Ukrainian market.
Reality: In fact, the DCFTA foresees that only 27 Ukrainian sectorial technical regulations for
industrial products will be aligned with EU regulations, such as those applying to toys, lifts,
refrigerators etc. So far, Ukraine has already brought 24 sectorial technical regulations for industrial
products in line with EU regulations.
Russia's request for transition periods postponing the alignment of Ukraine’s regulations with those
of the EU would effectively force Ukraine to roll back already transposed EU legislation. This would
violate provisions of the DCFTA (Art. 56).
Furthermore, to our knowledge no Russian company has yet complained that it faced difficulties in
exporting its products to Ukraine due to technical regulations. After looking more closely into recent
trade figures, we see rather an increase in Russian exports to Ukraine in the sectors where Ukrainian
regulations have been aligned with EU standards. The share of Russian exports to Ukraine of goods
falling under EU-based harmonisation of technical regulations, in line with commitments under the
DCFTA, out of overall Ukraine-Russia bilateral trade in goods increased from 8.8% to 12.3% between
2012 and 2014.
This is probably due to the fact that Russia generally has an interest in harmonising its technical
regulations and standards with those of the EU in various sectors, as it wants to attract EU investors
and to be able to export to the EU in the future. For many years the EU has conducted projects with
Russia concerning harmonisation of technical regulation for industrial products.
As such, since 2013, the Commission has been financing a project on 'Approximation of EU and
Russian Federation technical regulation and standardisations systems'. This project seems to be
fruitful regarding work with the Russian authorities on the approximation of technical regulations,
even if in practice some of the legislation is not applied on the ground. The Customs Union (the
Eurasian Economic Union since 2015) has adopted 35 technical regulations, a number of which are
Page 3 of 3
based on and broadly in line with EU regulations (for example toys, machinery, low voltage,
electromagnetic compatibility, personal protective equipment).
In line with the flexibilities foreseen in the DCFTA, the EU is ready to consider longer transition
periods for technical regulations linked to certain sectors/goods if Russia demonstrates the need for
it. However, until now, Russia has not provided figures on its exports to Ukraine in specific sectors
where Ukraine has already aligned or is supposed to align its legislation with that of the EU. Instead,
Russia has designated seven sectors to be of particular economic importance for Russia, however,
without any factual evidence or clear justification. Ukraine has already approximated its regulations
with those of the EU in six out of these seven sectors concerned.
Myth 3: The EU wants to force Russia to change customs rules set in the Free Trade Agreement
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS-FTA).
Reality: Russia considers the current CIS-FTA rules of origin as too permissive. According to Russia,
under the current rules certain goods imported by Ukraine could easily get Ukrainian origin and be
exported to Russia without customs duties.
In fact, in the trilateral talks, the Commission simply said that Russia is free to initiate a procedure to
change its CIS-FTA rules if it considers that the CIS-FTA rules of origin lead to problems each time a
CIS-FTA member signs a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with another country.
The EU's position is based on its belief that customs rules should be functional and respect the rule
that FTAs do not lead to mutual exclusivity of involved partners.
Myth 4: The EU obliges Russia to adopt the EU phytosanitary control system.
Reality: The EU never forced Russia to adopt European SPS standards. It is clear, however, that
Russian exports to the EU have to conform to EU SPS standards. In the context of the trilateral talks,
the EU has responded to Russian SPS-related concerns about customs cooperation with Ukraine and
proposed an updated bilateral process of acceptance of veterinary certificates, the mutual
evaluation of SPS systems, a revision of rules of origin within the CIS-FTA, and deeper customs
service cooperation to fight fraud.
Myth 5: Russia's proposal to introduce a 'transition period of no more than ten years for a
limited number of trade sectors' is not a problem.
Reality: This proposal may appear innocuous at first sight but it would mean prohibiting large parts
of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA from being applied for many years.
At the same time, it is doubtful that this would have a positive impact for Russian exports. This
Russian proposal is an example of Russia's misinterpretation of the Commission's mandate 'to
elaborate practical solutions to Russian concerns linked to the implementation of the DCFTA'.
Myth 6: Extensive data on prices and customs valuation for each and every single transaction on
goods exported to Ukraine would be essential for Russia. The EU needs to provide it.
Reality: This would not provide Russia with verifiable information about the origin of the goods
imported by Russia from Ukraine. In addition, it would be in contradiction of EU privacy legislation to
protect the confidentiality of business information.
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/december/tradoc_154127.pdf
Похоже, дело Юкоса ничему кремлинов не научило. Они дали полностью легальный повод обвинить их во всех смертных грехах.
Кстати, вот интересно, почему им не пришла в голову такая мысль, дать команду Януковичу своим последним указом отменить ЗСТ между Россией и Украиной? Преподнести это, как уступку скачущим майдаунам, типа мы отменяем ЗСТ с Россией, чтобы идти в Европу?
Почему они вообще не просчитали заранее эту тему с Евромайданом, хотя это было очевидно еще 10 лет назад после цветной революции в Грузии, что партнеры получат контроль над Укрой?
Ну ладно, повторюсь, это не является принципиальным вопросом для rnoflyzone. Он оставляет его на усмотрение кремлинов и их избирателей. Возможно, опять придется терять лицо, сдавая назад и соглашаясь на условия ЕС, и объясняя каким-то образом избирателям этот новый слив после громких заявлений Путина и Медведева о крахе российской экономики из-за ЗСТ. Но на самом деле это непонятно для простых людей, в отличии от слива Донецка. Правила международной торговли - это очень сложные материи.
В общем, убытки от Украины - потерянные инвестиции, потери от санкций, будущего введения ЗСТ, траты на скидки на газ, уголь, электричество и кредиты, потери от краха ЕАС и т.п. постепенно приближаются за все время с развала СССР к триллиону долларов.
Какая все-таки дорогая страна.
Как раз в Минских соглашениях прописано черным по белому, что должны быть приняты практические шаги по снятию российских озабоченностей. Ни одного практического шага по снятию российских озабоченностей за эти полтора года предпринято не было
замглавы Минэкономразвития РФ Алексей Лихачев
Но Еврокомиссия считает иначе!!! Что все необходимые практические шаги предприняты были!!! Еврокомиссия выпустила документ из 6 пунктов, в котором, по её мнению, развенчала российскую ложь.
T R I L A T E R A L T A L K S O N EU-UK R A I N E DCFTA
DI S T I N G U I S H I N G B E T W E E N MY T H S & RE A L I T Y
The EU remains committed and open to achieving practical solutions to Russia's
concerns on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Area (DCFTA).
The trilateral consultation process at ministerial level was launched in July 2014.
Up to end of 2015, 13 trilateral meetings, including 4 at ministerial level, have
taken place to this end.
This document sheds some light on certain myths related to this process.
Myth 1: Russia can change CIS-FTA customs rules without having to hold consultations with all
other CIS-FTA countries.
Reality: Russia claims it adheres to CIS-FTA rules and the resulting obligation of mutual
consultations. It disregards the same CIS-FTA rules, however, when it comes to unilaterally
withdrawing trade preferences towards Moldova (July 2014) and now Ukraine.
Under CIS-FTA safeguards rules (annex 6), in order to increase import tariffs against another CIS-FTA
member (e.g. Ukraine), Russia must:
consult the other countries of the CIS-FTA;
demonstrate product by product that the changed circumstances (i.e. the provisional
application of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA as of 1 January 2016) would lead to 'an increase in
imports from the Party in such quantities as to cause damage or threaten to harm the
industry of Custom Union'.
Currently, Russia neither demonstrated such an increase in imports or related negative effects
stemming from the implementation of the DCFTA because the DCFTA has not yet come into force.
The Commission has offered to continue the consultations after 1 January 2016. The Commission's
offer to continue is however conditional on Russia's revocation of the Presidential decree that
suspends it CIS FTA obligations towards Ukraine.
Myth 2: The EU demands that all goods sold on the Ukrainian market should comply with
European technical standards. This excludes Russian products from the Ukrainian market.
Reality: In fact, the DCFTA foresees that only 27 Ukrainian sectorial technical regulations for
industrial products will be aligned with EU regulations, such as those applying to toys, lifts,
refrigerators etc. So far, Ukraine has already brought 24 sectorial technical regulations for industrial
products in line with EU regulations.
Russia's request for transition periods postponing the alignment of Ukraine’s regulations with those
of the EU would effectively force Ukraine to roll back already transposed EU legislation. This would
violate provisions of the DCFTA (Art. 56).
Furthermore, to our knowledge no Russian company has yet complained that it faced difficulties in
exporting its products to Ukraine due to technical regulations. After looking more closely into recent
trade figures, we see rather an increase in Russian exports to Ukraine in the sectors where Ukrainian
regulations have been aligned with EU standards. The share of Russian exports to Ukraine of goods
falling under EU-based harmonisation of technical regulations, in line with commitments under the
DCFTA, out of overall Ukraine-Russia bilateral trade in goods increased from 8.8% to 12.3% between
2012 and 2014.
This is probably due to the fact that Russia generally has an interest in harmonising its technical
regulations and standards with those of the EU in various sectors, as it wants to attract EU investors
and to be able to export to the EU in the future. For many years the EU has conducted projects with
Russia concerning harmonisation of technical regulation for industrial products.
As such, since 2013, the Commission has been financing a project on 'Approximation of EU and
Russian Federation technical regulation and standardisations systems'. This project seems to be
fruitful regarding work with the Russian authorities on the approximation of technical regulations,
even if in practice some of the legislation is not applied on the ground. The Customs Union (the
Eurasian Economic Union since 2015) has adopted 35 technical regulations, a number of which are
Page 3 of 3
based on and broadly in line with EU regulations (for example toys, machinery, low voltage,
electromagnetic compatibility, personal protective equipment).
In line with the flexibilities foreseen in the DCFTA, the EU is ready to consider longer transition
periods for technical regulations linked to certain sectors/goods if Russia demonstrates the need for
it. However, until now, Russia has not provided figures on its exports to Ukraine in specific sectors
where Ukraine has already aligned or is supposed to align its legislation with that of the EU. Instead,
Russia has designated seven sectors to be of particular economic importance for Russia, however,
without any factual evidence or clear justification. Ukraine has already approximated its regulations
with those of the EU in six out of these seven sectors concerned.
Myth 3: The EU wants to force Russia to change customs rules set in the Free Trade Agreement
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS-FTA).
Reality: Russia considers the current CIS-FTA rules of origin as too permissive. According to Russia,
under the current rules certain goods imported by Ukraine could easily get Ukrainian origin and be
exported to Russia without customs duties.
In fact, in the trilateral talks, the Commission simply said that Russia is free to initiate a procedure to
change its CIS-FTA rules if it considers that the CIS-FTA rules of origin lead to problems each time a
CIS-FTA member signs a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with another country.
The EU's position is based on its belief that customs rules should be functional and respect the rule
that FTAs do not lead to mutual exclusivity of involved partners.
Myth 4: The EU obliges Russia to adopt the EU phytosanitary control system.
Reality: The EU never forced Russia to adopt European SPS standards. It is clear, however, that
Russian exports to the EU have to conform to EU SPS standards. In the context of the trilateral talks,
the EU has responded to Russian SPS-related concerns about customs cooperation with Ukraine and
proposed an updated bilateral process of acceptance of veterinary certificates, the mutual
evaluation of SPS systems, a revision of rules of origin within the CIS-FTA, and deeper customs
service cooperation to fight fraud.
Myth 5: Russia's proposal to introduce a 'transition period of no more than ten years for a
limited number of trade sectors' is not a problem.
Reality: This proposal may appear innocuous at first sight but it would mean prohibiting large parts
of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA from being applied for many years.
At the same time, it is doubtful that this would have a positive impact for Russian exports. This
Russian proposal is an example of Russia's misinterpretation of the Commission's mandate 'to
elaborate practical solutions to Russian concerns linked to the implementation of the DCFTA'.
Myth 6: Extensive data on prices and customs valuation for each and every single transaction on
goods exported to Ukraine would be essential for Russia. The EU needs to provide it.
Reality: This would not provide Russia with verifiable information about the origin of the goods
imported by Russia from Ukraine. In addition, it would be in contradiction of EU privacy legislation to
protect the confidentiality of business information.
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/december/tradoc_154127.pdf
Похоже, дело Юкоса ничему кремлинов не научило. Они дали полностью легальный повод обвинить их во всех смертных грехах.
Кстати, вот интересно, почему им не пришла в голову такая мысль, дать команду Януковичу своим последним указом отменить ЗСТ между Россией и Украиной? Преподнести это, как уступку скачущим майдаунам, типа мы отменяем ЗСТ с Россией, чтобы идти в Европу?
Почему они вообще не просчитали заранее эту тему с Евромайданом, хотя это было очевидно еще 10 лет назад после цветной революции в Грузии, что партнеры получат контроль над Укрой?
Ну ладно, повторюсь, это не является принципиальным вопросом для rnoflyzone. Он оставляет его на усмотрение кремлинов и их избирателей. Возможно, опять придется терять лицо, сдавая назад и соглашаясь на условия ЕС, и объясняя каким-то образом избирателям этот новый слив после громких заявлений Путина и Медведева о крахе российской экономики из-за ЗСТ. Но на самом деле это непонятно для простых людей, в отличии от слива Донецка. Правила международной торговли - это очень сложные материи.
В общем, убытки от Украины - потерянные инвестиции, потери от санкций, будущего введения ЗСТ, траты на скидки на газ, уголь, электричество и кредиты, потери от краха ЕАС и т.п. постепенно приближаются за все время с развала СССР к триллиону долларов.
Какая все-таки дорогая страна.
